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INTRODUCTION
Since Ja9:J, U.S. Navy Regulations
have tasked naval officers with the
responsihility of exercising their ilHlc·
pendent judgment in the application of
force to protect the lives and property
of U.S. citizens on foreign soil against
actual or impending arhitrary violence.
These regulations were written at a time
when international law recognized the
principle of applied force to protect the
lives and property of nationals in foreign states when the foreign state was
unable or unwilling to protect them.
The purpose of this paper is to
examine these regulations in the light of
the changes that have taken place in
international law-in the 76 years since
they were drafted-in order to estahlish
whether they have any utility in today's
world. Noting that the majority of
instances in which the United States has
u::'ed force for the protection of its
citizens ahroad have taken place in

Latin America and also that the restraints imposed hy international treaty
are particularly meaningful in this ar('a,
Latin America has heen ehmmll as the
huckground locale.

I-THE NAVAL OFFICER
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The navlli admiral or (:aptain ... in international law, as in
strategy and tactics ... must
know the doctrine of his country.
In emergencies, not infrequently,
he has had to act for his superior,
without orders, in the spirit and
manner his superior would desire ... Injudicious action may
precipitate hostilities; or injudicious inaction may permit infringement of American rights, of
persons or of properLy.1
Today, Lhe officers alHI men of all
branches of the service are living and
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operating in all areas of the world in
furtherance of our Nation's ohjectives.
The responsibilities neccssarily attending these operations create frequent
direct relations with foreign governments, hoth allied and neutral. In these
relations it is incumhcnt that our Nation's representatives be guided by "the
principles and rules of conduct .•. which states feel themselves
bound to ohserve, and, "therefore, do
commonly ohserve in their relations
with each other."2 The Navy, because
of the necessity of conducting operations heyond the continental limits of
the United States, has always stressed
the study of international law for its
officers. To further the education of the
naval officer in the field of international
law, the Naval War College inaugurated
the "Blue Book" program in 1894, 10
years after thc founding of the Naval
War Collegc itself, to disseminate pertinent educational and informational
material in the field of international law
to all naval officers.3
U.S. Navy Regulations, which are in
the nature of general orders to all
members of the naval service, place
particular emphasis on international
law. Artiele 1214, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1948, provides that "all persons
in the naval scrviee, in their relations
with foreign nations, and with the government or agcnts thereof, shall conform to international law and to the
preccdents established by the United
States in such relations," while artiele
0505 makes it mandatory for a commanding officer to ohserve and require
his command to observe the "principles
of international law." Among the principles of international law are those
found in articles 0613 and 0614 concerning the protection of the lives and
properly of U.S. citizens on foreign
territory.
Thl'$l' urticll's pro\,id.,:
Article 0613. Violations of International Law and Treaties.

On occasions where injury to
thc Unitcd Statcs or to citizcns
thereof is eOlllllliLLNI or threatened, in violation of the principiI'S
of internationul law or treuty
rights, the scnior officer prcscnt
shall consult with the diplomatic
or consular representatives of the
United States, if possible, and
shall take such action as the
gravity of the situation demands.
The rcsponsibility for any action
tuken by u navul force, howevcr,
rests wholly upon the senior officer present. lIe shall immediately
report all the facts to the Secretary of the Navy.
Article 0614. Use of Foree
Against a Friendly State.
1. The use of force by United
States naval personnel against a
friendly foreign state, or against
anyone within the territories
thereof, is illegal.
2. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which
bl'longs to states as well as to
individuals, and in the case of
statcs it includes the protection of
the state, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property
of its citizens against arhitrnry
violence, actual or impending,
whereby the state or its citizens
may suffer irreparable injury. The
conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the
sound judgment of responsible
officers, who arc to perform their
duties in this respect with all
possible care and forebearance. In
no case shall force be exercised in
time of pcace otherwise than as an
applil'ut ion of t he right of sl'l fpn's,'n'nt ion as IIhoVl' tI,'finl,d, It
IIlUst be uscil only liS it lust resort,
and then only to tlw extent which
is ubsolutdy nccessary to accolll-
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pi ish the end required. 1L can
never he exercised with a view to
innicting punishment for the aels
already committed.
3. Whenever, in the application
of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become necessary
to land an armed force in a
foreign territory on occasions of
political disturbance where the
local authorities are unable to give
adequate protection of life and
property, the assent of such authorities, or of some of them,
shall first be obtained, if it can be
done without prejudice to the
interests involved.
It is interesting to note that these
articles have remained virtually unchanged since 1893 when they were
first drafteJ and incorporated in the
Regulations for the Government of the
Navy of the United States as paragraphs
285,286, and 287, section 4, chapter V,
and when principles of international law
pl'rmilll'd a slatl' to use force for the
protection of its citizl'ns and their
property in a foreign state.4 From a
mere perusal of these articles it seems
that the enforcement of duties under
international law is left largely to the
discretion of the commanding officer.
I n fact, prior to 1928 this was largely
so. In recounting 76 instances where
armed forces of the United States operated on forei~ soil or engnged in
actual hostilities with another nation on
her soil under the guise of protecting
U.S. citizens or their property abroad,
Milton Offutt states:
What has generally happened ... is that naval officers
commanding ships or squadrons
on foreign stations have taken
such action as they bclieved necessary for the protection of Amcrican livl's and property, and have
reported their action to thc Sl'cretary of. the Navy after thcir

government hm; hecn committed
to their proccdurcs.s
Thl'se cases covered a timespan from
IB13 to 1926, and on only one occasion
did the Government refuse to approve
the decision of a commanding officer of
sending a landing party ashore. 6
There have hcen many changes since
the drafting of these regulations, both in
our foreign policy and in the accepted
principles of international law, yet the
regulations still remain. Some of the
language as well as the concepts appear
dated. For instance, the regulations address themselves to the 19th century
concept of "self-preservation," generally
conceded as broadcning the principle of
"self-defense" to the point where it was
quite inadmissible. Waldock quotes Hall
as saying "in the last resort almost the
whole of the duties of states arc subordinated to the right of self-preservation,"7 while himself maintaining that
"such a doctrine would destroy the
imperative character of lilly system of
law in which it Wl.IS applil'll. for it makes
all ohligation to olH'Y thl' law nll'rt'ly
conditional; and there is hardly 1111 act
of international lawlessness which it
might not bc claimed to exeuse.,,8
Of far greater significance is the
prohihition of Llw usc of force aga;nst
tIl(: poliLical independence and Lerritorial integrity of states set forth in the
United Nations Charter and also emhodied in the charters of regional organizations and security alliances. As
most insLances involving the use of force
to protect lives and property of our
nationals abroad occurred in Latin
America, an understanding of the impact made hy Latin American regionalism with its strong attitudes of nonintervention, state sovereignty, self-determination, and exclusive competence on
this traditional right of international law
is crucial whcn evaluating the utility of
Llwse provisions of U.S. Navy Regulations which imposed upon the naval
officer the duLy to exercise his in de-
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11I'IICIt'nt judgment when the lives or
pmpl'rty of U.S. naLionals are in jeop-

Irtly.
II-TilE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM:
AN OVERVIEW
Historical Experience. The present
Clmrll'r of the Organization of Amerirnn Statl~s, daLed 2 May 1948, must be
I!lokl'd at in the perspeeLive of hisLory.
It~ I'volution has been described as a
"tr;lII~ition from an unwritten to a
"rilll'n eonsLitution. ,,1 As early as
lIl:!h. Simon Bolivar recognized the
"I'uklll'ss of American Republics and
(,1I11t·" for a general American congress
tl) cllnvene in Panama for the purpose
I)f ~igning treaties of alliance. AILhough
IItlt'nded by only four countries, Colomhill. !'I'ru, Cenlrlll America, and Mexi('1),2 the Cong~css of Panama may he
l'ilid to Imve laid the cornerstone for
(utllrl' hemispheric solidarity and underfltanding. The charLer's origins may also
hi' traced Lo the Monroe Doctrine,
I'nUlII'iaLed in a PresidenLial message of
2 Ih'cemhl'r lB2:~, which proclaimed
IlIlninll'rvcnLion of Europe in the govI'rnnll'nts of the WesLern Hemispherc.
Bllth the Monroc Doctrine and thc
Panullla Treaty were dircctl'd primarily
t!lward tlw prohlt·m of defending the
!'lIvl'reignty of sLaLcs in the WesLern
1I1'lIIispherc, but unlike the Monroe
Dllc·trine, which was a unilaLeral proclamation by the United StaLes, the
Panama TreaLy envisioned binding all
1IIl'lIIhl'r states to muLual defense.
'I'lli'm werc a seril's of intcr-Amcrican
confercnces betwcen IB26 and 18B9,
having as their principal object common
defl'm~e and muLual protection of participating states, but thcre was no true
hemispheric representation until 1889
when the United States took its first
positive step toward crl'ating a hl'lIIi!'Jlhcrie oq!anii:ation by calling for thl'
Fin~t
International Confercnee of
Amrrican States to nwet in Washington,
D.C. There, in 1890, wiLh all the

eounLries of the Western Hemisphere
represenLed, except the Dominican Republic, were laid the bases for the Pan
American movement by the creation of
a permanent inter-American organization, the Commercial Bureau of the
American Republics, later designated
the Pan American Union.
History indicates that the United
States was motivated more by a desire
Lo esLahlish economic relations than a
desire to insure the maintenance of
political and social stability within the
framework of the Pan American Union.
The rcason why is evident. The UniLcd
SLates, by this time ~ world power, saw
little need for mutual defense arrangements with her neighbors to thc south
who were characterized by political
instahility and economic backwardness.
In the years following the foundation of
what Latin American governments must
have hoped was a true international
organization, as envisioned by Simon
Bolivar in 1826, the United States
assumed not only the role of protector
of the Western Hemisphere, but also
that of mcntor. Under the Roosevl'lt
I:orollary to thc Monroc Doctrine, LI\(,
United States asscrted the right to inLcrvene in Latin American countries in
order to pTl'vent the intervention of
European powers in CirClIJIlslilllees of
political or economic chaos. European
intervention at this time was quite
common and deemed justified to collect
overdue dehts. Such intervention might
have given European powers a pretext
for reesLablishing hases in the Western
Ilt'misphere imd thereby weaken national seeuriLy. If LaLin American countries did not exercise their sovereign
powers responsibly enough to avoid
giving European powers a just cause for
intervention, the United States, to protect itself from harm, stepped in. Using
thit~ rationil!t·, the United Stall's interwned in the Dominican Hl'llUhlie, lIaiti,
and Nicaragua and used its power to
gain strategic objectives in Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and Panama. Instead of ushering
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in an era of understanding and international cooperation, the creation of the
Pan American Union was a prelude to
an era of frank and deliberate military
intervention in Latin America under the
pretext of upholding the Monroe Doctrine. The Department of State Bulletin
lists 35 examples of U.S. intervention in
the affairs of Latin America from 1812
to 1926.3
Fight for a Concept. It is small
,yonder then that the development of
the inter-American system durin/!: the
years 1890-1933 was characterized by
Latin American efforts to secure principles of nonintervention that would
govrrn relations among member states
of the Pan American Union or that
these principles loom so large in the
present Charter of the Organization of
American Shlll.es. On the other hand, the
U.S. position on intervention was not
without merit and had a strong hasis in
then existing international law. The
United States was particularly concernt'd with protecting its nationals and
their property from violence in Latin
American countries when the local authorities were unable or unwilling to
protect them. The views of the U.S.
Government on this right of intervention wcre very clearly expressed Ily
Charles Evans Hughes, American ddcgate at the Havana Conference in 1928,
in resisting the principle advocated by
the Latin American countries that no
state had the right to intervenc in the
internal or external affairs of another.
What are we to do when governments break down and American
citizens are in danger of their
lives? ..• I am not speaking of
sporadic acts of violencc, or of the
rising of mobs, or or' those dist£l'ssing incidents, which may
occur in <Iny eountry howl'vl'r
wdl mlll1ini~tcred. I mn slll'akin~
of the occasions where Isie 1 govrrnment itself is unable to

function for a time because of
difficulties which confront it and
which it is impossible for it to
surmount.
Now it is a principal [sic] of
international law that in such a
case a government is fully justified
in taking action-I would call it
interposition of a temporary
character-for the purpose of
protecting the lives and property
of its nationals. I could say that
that is not intervention .•. Of
course the United States cannot
forego its right to protect its
citizens.4
However, hy 1928 it also had become clear to the United States that any
mraningful regional association in the
Western Ilemisphere would depend on a
shift from its position of unilateral
intervention, and that year saw the
abandonment of the Roosevelt corollary
to the i\'lonroe Doctrine in the Clark
Memorandum. Thereafter, military interventions in Haiti and Nicaraguas
were liquidated; the Platt amendment
under which the United States was given
the right to intervene in Cuba was
abrogated in 1934, and a new treaty was
negotiated with Panama concerning the
Panama Canal in 1I):l(i. In 19:1:1 the
United Statcs, at the Seventh Inter~merican Conference, accepted in prinCIple the doctrine of nonintervention
and then embraced it totally in 1936 at
the Buenos Aires Conference for the
l\laintenance of Peace. By signing an
Additional Protocol relative to nonintervcntion,6 the United Stales was generally regarded as unequivocally renouncing the principle of intervention for the
protection of the lives and property oC
nationals. 7
I f any doubt remained recrarding the
.
f
t'
VII'W 0
the lInill'd Stall's, it wns "i~pl'llrli ill 19:iB whrll Secretary of State
I>ull('s, atltl£l's~illg himself to the civil
slrife in Lebanon, said:
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Now what we would do if American life and property was I[;ic 1
endangered would depend, of
course, in the first insLanee upon
what we were requcsLcd Lo do by
the Government of Lebanon. We
do not introduce American forccs
into for('ign counLrics cxcept on
the invitaLion of the lawful government of the SLate coneerned.s
This change of policy on the part of
the United SLaLes was occasioncd not
only by a realizaLion that its past policy
of unilateralism and inLervcntion had
failed Lo esLahlish sLrong viable govcrnmenLs and had cvoked deep resentment,
but also by a realization that hemispheric solidarity of Cered the bcst security against the subversive acLivities of
the European powcrs with their large
communities 111 Latin Amcrica. 9 This
hemispheric solidariLy manifested iLsclf
in an inLer-Amrrican security sysLem
with two focal poinLs: consulLation if
peace were LhreaLened (Buenos Aires,
19:1(i) and colle cLive acLion to repel or
prevent 11ggre~sion (I1avana, 1940).
The New Illslnnnenls. TIII~ changeover from a policy oC unilateral interven tion to one of collective responsihility for hemisphcrie solidarity is
emllodied in the two documents Lhat
arc the founclaLions of the Organization
of American SLaLcs: the Inter-American
Treaty of He('iprocal Assistance of 1947
(called the Rio Treaty) and the Charter
of the Organization of American States
signed in 1948. AILhough boLh of the~e
documenLs postdated the United NaLions CharIer, the basic principles conlaincd in them were firmly fixed at the
time of the signing of the Charter in San
Francisco in 1945. The Latin American
~Iall'~, IUl\'ing won from Ihl' L1nilt'd
:-'Iah'~ rt'l'ognilion of Ihl' l'rint'iplt' Ill'
nllninll'f\'I'nlilln, \I I'n' :lllxioll~ 10 1'1"1"
wnl any illlJlllll'lll'Y 10 1111'ir n'gional
organizaLion, parLielllarly in IIIl' an'a of
intrrvenLion by non-American powers in

the mainLenance of pcace and s,!<!urity
among A merican StaLes. Largely as a
result of Lheir in[;istem:e in mainLaining
the integrity of Lheir regional sl!eurity
sysLem, provisions were ineorporaLed in
the UniLed Nations Charter assuring the
continued viability of regional organizaLions in areas relaLing to the mainLenanee oC international peace and
security.
The CharLer oC the Organization of
American SLates, signed in 19411, is "an
amazing composit Lsic] of rules, agreements, principles, and aspiraLions,,,l 0
none of which arc new huL merely the
eodiCieation, coneenLration, and reconstruction of what had transpired in the
inter-American system since 1826. 11
That noninLervenLion continued to be
Lhe fundamenLal principle of intcrAmerican solidarity is clear from the
language of the charter. According to
article 15:
No SLaLe or group of States has
the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the inLcrnal or extcrnal
affairs of any oLher SLaLe. The
fon'going principle prohibiLs not
only armed force but also any
oLher form of interference or atLempLed thrcaL against thc personality of the SLatc or againsL iLs
political, economic and cultural
elements.
Aud article 17:
The terri Lory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the ohjeet,
evl'u Lemporarily, of miliLary
occupation or of other measures
of force taken by another StaLe,
direcLly or indircctly, on any
woulJ(lg whaLever. No Lerritorial
al'quisil ions or ~Jl",'ial aclvanlal!"s
ohlaiJll'c1 I'illll'r h\' 1'01"1'1' or h\'
0111" .. llll':ln~
1";I'I"l'iun shall \;"
rl'('ognizl'd.

or

TIll' prineiplc of noninLervention is
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extended further by article 16, which
affirms:
No State may use or encourage
the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in
order to force the sovereign will
of another State and obtain from
it advantages of any kind.
Thus extended in articles 15 through
17, the principle of nonintervention had
to be reconciled with that of collective
seeurity, already recognized in the Rio
Treaty and the United Nations Charter.
Article 19 of the charter thus provides:
fvleasures adopted for the main·
tenance of peace and security in
accordance with existing treaties
do not constitute a violation of
the pri~ciples set forth in Articles
15 and 17.

III-INTER VENTION-SOME
EXAMPLES OF
CONTEMPORARY POLICY
Intervention is a word whieh is
often used quite generally to
denote almost any act of inter·
ference hy one state in the affairs
of another; hut in a more special
sense it means dictatorial inter·
ference in the domestic or foreign
affairs of another state which impairs that state's independence.!
While all nations agree on the hroad
principle that intervention is unlawful,
there is less agreement on just what is
encompassed by the term "intervention." The traditional doctrine of relating intervention to the use of or
threat to use force does not conform to
the language of article 15 of the charter,
hut if intervention is carried to the
ultimale and impractical ('xln'me in:::isled upon hy Ihe draflers or II\('
charter Lo covcr all acLs thaL lIlay he
vicwcd as prcssure, it becomes nehulous.
Some act. of evcry naLion may scnd its

reverberations everywhere. The United
States, by the exercise of its economic
and political policies, whether they be
foreign or domestic, exercised through
action or inaction, may intervene in
Latin American affairs as effectively as
did the sending of Marines in earlier
times. It has often been said, in more
than jest, that if the economy of the
United States sneezes, the countries of
Latin America catch pneumonia. Will
not, then, the participation of the
United States in the Alliance for Progress inevitabl~ lead to an accusation of
intervention'! By its very prcsence, the
United States affects the internal affairs
of its neighbors to the south. Thus, by
painting with such a broad brush, the
drafters of the charter may have de·
feated the very purpose of the prohibition. If one becomes enamored by the
all-encompassing euphonic concept of
nonintervention advocated by these
Latin American jurists, one is left with a
concept that is hound to fail as incompatihle with the realities of international
politics.
It is hard to condellln prohihitions
on intervention for they arc certainly
part of a quest for an ideal seen as the
('qual sovereignty and inuep(muenee of
all nalions. However, a more reali~tie
approaeh than that ndql't('llllt \lo~()ta iH
expressed by the Unit('d Kingdom in the
report of the Special Committee on
Principles of International Laws Concerning Friendly Rclations and Cooperation Among States:
... it would be recognized that in
an interdependent world, it is
inevitable and dcsirable that statcs
will be concerned with lmd seek
to influence the actions and
policies of other states, and the
objective of international law is
not to prI'v('nt sueh aClivity. hut
ra tlll'r to il\sun~ that it is
eompatiblc with the sovereigu
eq uaIity of states and selfdetermination of their peoples.3
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Nice sounding words, but what of the
objcctivity of international law if the
onus is to be placed there? If there is
lack of agreement on lawful intervention when economic issues are involved,
the problem becomes indeed chaotic
when examining areas where political
issues are paramount. The interventions
in Greece, Lebanon, Algeria, the Congo,
the Suez Canal, and Vietnam are examples of cases where conflicting political interests of partics concerned produced not only conflicting statements
of facts, hut also incompatible legal
analyscs. 4 In our own hemisphere we
can find examples in Guatemala (1954)
and the Dominican Republic (1965).
Guatemala. The Guatemalan crisis of
1954 is cited as confirming the greater
fear Latin Ameficans have of U.S. intervention than 0 intervention from outside the Western Hemisphere. s In l\larch
1951, Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
assumed the Presidency of Guatemala.
His government quickly took on a decided Communist 0\'t'rtone_ 6 The
American-owned United Fruit Company
was informed in Fehruary ] 95:1 that
234,000 of its :~OO,OO() acres on the
Pacific coast would be expropriated
under agrarian reform legislation enacted in 1953. Compensation offered hy
the Guatemalan Government amounted
to 8600,000 in bonds, although the
United Fruit Company estimated its
value at 84,000,000_ Later that same
year, the Guatemalan Government expropriated the 174,000 acres owned hy
United Fruit on the Caribbean coast.
The expropriated land was distributed
to landless peasants. 7
On 17 May 1954, the U.S. State
Department announced that a shipment
of arms had been landed in Guatemala
after having been shipped from Communist Poland. This eau~d the 1I11ilt'd
States to ship arms supplies to Ilonduras
and Nicaragua pursuant to military assistance pacts concluded on 20 May and
23 April. Shortly thereafter, on 18 June

Guatemalan insurgent forces under the
command of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas
(a Guatemalan Army officer who had
been in political exile since 1951)
crossed the frontier from Honduras and
advanced into Guatemala at several
points. 8 President Arbenz Guzman
charged Honduras and Nicaragua with
open aggression in conjunction with the
United States and called for an immediate meeting of the United Nations
Security Council. 9
Article 20 of the Charter of the
Organization of A meriean States provides that "all international disputes
that may arise between American States
shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures sct forth in this Charter, before
being referred to the Security Council
of the United Nations." In the same
vein, article 2 of the Rio Treaty obligates the parties "to submit every controversy that may arise hetween them to
methods of peaceful settlement and to
endeavor to settle any such controversy
among themsclves by means of procedures in force in the Inter-American
System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council
of the llnited NaLions." When the
Guatemalan charge came to the Security
Council, the United States and the two
Latin American memhers of the Security Council maintained that the complaint should be referred to the Organization of American States. By refusing
to take substantive action on Guatemala's appeals, the Security Council
"implicitly adopted the view that a
member of the Organization of American States should, in fulfillment of its
regional obligations and in the spirit of
the United Nations Charter, seek to
have the case resolved in the regional
organization before bringing it to the
Security Council.,,1 0
While the Security r.oundl maintained a hands-o fC policy, the In tcrAmerican Peace Commission (an agency
of the Organization of American States)
appointed a factfinding committee to
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visit GuaLemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. llowcver, on 27 June 1954,
Pf(!sident Arbenz Guzman had resigned,
and afLer negotiations wiLh his succes·
sors a five-man junLa was sel up Lo rule
Guatemala wiLh Colonel Armas as President. The new Guatemalan Government
was officially recognized hy the United
SLates on 1 July 11)54. Subsequently,
at the request of the new adminisLration, the entire maLLer was withdrawn
from the Organization of Americlln
StaLes and the Security CounciL I 1 On
2() j)1'ccmlwr 1954, an agreenll'nL was
rt'aehed lwtween the new government
and the United Fruit Company by
which all the lands expropriated under
the land reform legislation were resLored. 12

a

The Dominican Republic. On 28
April 1%5, U.S. Marines landed in the
Dominican Repuhlic for the express
purpose of proLecLing lind evaeullting
U.S. ciLizens and other foreign nationals
and to proLect the U.S. Embassy in
Sunto Domingo. This action was
occa~ioned lIy assl!rtions Lhat A mcril"an
liVl's were in dan~er and Lhal local
authorilies were no longl'r able to p:uaranLee the safety of U.S. citizens l3
following a virLual civil war uprising
piLLing the lefList supporters of ex-President .I uan Bosch and rightwing elemenLs
'Ied by Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin.
In i tially, only ,1.05 l\larines were
landed. f 4 By :30 A prj), about 2,:>00 of
the estimaLed 3,000 U.S. nationals in
the Dominican Repuhlic had been
evacuaLed together with other foreign
nationals,15 yet on J May, the United
SLlltes increased its troop sLrcngth to
6,200. 16 0 n 2 May, PresidenL J ohJ1son
announced that he had commiLLed a
LoLal of 14,000 troops Lo the Dominican
Hqlllhlic and sLaLed Lheir lllis~i(}11 as
proh'ctin:;! lives and pn'VI'II l ill:;! "allollH'r
CUIllIIIUllil'l Slall' ill lhis 1I1'1I1il'phl'n':'
Thl' I'rl'l'itll'lIt alll':;!I'11 that \I hal had
hegun :115 a popular demo era lie rl'volution had hcen taken over hy a band of

Communist conspiraLors. 17
The UniLed States had made an
immediaLe appl~al Lo the Orgunization of
American SLaLes for assisLance in carrying ouL her sdf-appoinlt'd Lask. l\111ny
Latin A nll'riClln COUll tries were highly
criLieal of the U.S. military inLervenLion,
contending that it eonLravened article
17 of the CharLer of the Organization of
Ameriean SLates, which holds the territory of a sLate inviolable and staLes that
it may not he the ohjeeL of even
tempomry military oeeupaLion for :Itly
rem,on whalso,~ver.1 8 TIll' United Stlllm;
prl'l,sed for the formation of an inltlrAmerican peace force to lIlulLilaLl'ralize
Lhe intervenLion at the TenLh Meeting of
ConsulLation convened on 1 May.
Opponents worried thaL a dangerous
precedent would be established in the
sanctioning of "eolleeLive intervention"
but undoubtedly hoped that the establishmenL of the peace force would bring
Lhe intervention Lo an end lind salvage
the prestige of the inter-American system. Supporters, on the oLher hand,
were probably anxious Lo cover up the
U.S. intervenLion with col\eeLive measures. 19 An inler-Ameriean pl'aee force
was formed on () May Lo 0pI'rall' under
the authority of the TenLh l\leeting, buL
the partieipaLion hy LaLin American
connLries was symholie only.20
Aftermath. The implieaLions of the
GuaLemalan incident in 1951J, were serious for LaLin America. NoL only was the
precedent estahlished that a member of
Lhe Organization of American States
would have Lo seck resolution of its case
in the regional organizaLion before
hringing it before the Security Council,
huL also the vast imbalance of power in
Lhe Western lIemisphere indicated thaL
very little could be accomplished within
lhe regional organization on hehalf of a
lllt'm\wr state OppOSi1l1! tlH' lInitl'c1
~lall'~ or il~ illll·I'I'l'I~. Thl'rl' \\'1111 Ii lilt'
dOlllil ill tIll' minds of mallY !'ulill
Anll'ricans lhaL the lJnilt'd States, in
eollahoration wiLh lIonduras and
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Nielln1gua (LWO of the smaller and leasL
signifiellnL LaLin American staLes), had
direeLly intervened in the affairs of
Guatemala. Miguel Y digoras Fuentes,
who assumed the Presidency of GuaLemala in ] 958, has indieal<:d that the
overLhrow of the Arbenz Guzman govermmmt was masterminded by the U.S.
Ambassador to Guatemala, John E.
Peurifoy, and implied further that
Colonel Armas was in the employ of the
UniLed Fruit Company.21
I f "the case of Guatemala had somewhat stained the shining armor of the
OAS,,,22 U.S. intervention in the
Dominican Repuhlic did far more, seemingly treating thc Organization as a
rubber stamp. The United States maintained that if time had permiLled the
entire matter would have been initially
referred to the Organization of American States23 alld thaL its own unilaL'~ral
action was only a necessary prelude to
multilaLeral eollecLive action and parLieipation by the OrganizaLion of American
States.24 There is no doubt that, given
the intense pathological fear of intervention prevalenL in Latin America, a mullila tl~ral, inter-American inLt'rvention
woul,1 he far h~ss repugnanL to world
opinion and aceeptahle to the state
intervened Lhan would unilateral action
hy the United States. While as Wright
ohserves, "intervention docs not guin in
legaliLy under customary international
law hy heing collective rather than
• d'lVI'. I ua 1,,25
. J ouL 1Iy I ,I'11'IC II,
III
,
as pomteu
"in humanitarian siLuations, the faeL
thaL more than one sLate has participated in the decision to intervene lessens the chance that the intervention
wiII he used for reasons of sclfinterest.,,26
I t must he pointed out, howcver,
that the intervenLion in the Dominican
Repuhlic helped to produce stahility,
allowing a free e1cction in which all
candidates hud un equally fair chanel' to
win. NI'ither of the two major eaIHIidates demanded wiLhdrawal of forces,
and while neither was overly enLhusi-

asLic ahouL the presence of foreign
forces on Dominican soil, neither reaCLed "with the typical outrage of nation-state leaders to the presence" of
the troops? 7

IV-INTERVENTION:
WHEN AND HOW
As intervention was recognized to be
contrary to intcrnational law, attempts
were made to justify acts of intervention as legitimate cases of protection of
nationals abroud or of self-defense. In
this regard, "intervention was not So
much a righL as a sanction against a
wrong or threatened wrong."1
Protection of Lives and Property. A
state's usc of force to protect the lives
and property of its nationals ahroad was
universally accepted as lawful by the
jurists of the 19Lh and early 20th
eenturies. 2 The justificution for this
concept was founded on the principle
that international law's protection of
sovereignty had a corollary duty imposed on a state to accord protection to
foreign nationals. If intcrnational law
prohihiled foreign intl'n'cntion of a
forel,Cul or cocreive ehuraeLt'r, it is
hl'eaut'(' it imposed a corresponding
duty on the state not to crcate or
tolerate conditions that justified such
. I crvenlIons:
.
3 '1'1 IUH, every fltah~ musL
III
afCord protection to aliens on her soil in
eonformity with civilized minimum
standards, and because individuals were
viewed in intcrnational law as objects
and thercfore an extension of their
domiciliary state, any injury done an
alien was an injury to his home state
who then had a legal right to seek
redress. 4 As private property and
human freedom were interrelated, it
followed that there was an equal international law prineiple affording a home
state the right to protect the private
property of her nalionals in a forci~1I
stale. S Today's utility of this I'riJl('il'lc
has heen drastically changed, particularly in Latin America.
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The Thomascs maintain that the legality
of protection of nationals hy means of
intervention must therefore rest on
some "primary right which is t'xc\lIlicd
from the non-intervention han. "7 Su("11
a primary right is the right of selfclt'fense reserved in the United Nations
Charter, article !)l; the Chartt'r of the
Organization of American States, articles 18 and 19; and the Rio Treaty,
article 3. This right, a strictly limited
one, must he determined hy reference
to customary internationallaw.8

of means and no moment for ddibl'ration" and further, the action taken must
involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited
by that necessity and kept clearly
within it."9 The conditions under which
a state may be entitled, as an aspect of
self-defense, to intervene in another
state, in order to protect its nationals
from injury, were formulated by Professor Waldock in 1952 as follows: "There
must be (1) an imminent threat of
injury to nationals, (2) a failure or
inability on the part of the territorial
sovereignty to protect them, and (3)
measures of protection strictly confined
to the subject of protecting them
against injury.,,1 0
Using these guidelines, the original
limited intervention in the disorders of
the Dominican Republic on 28 April
1965 to protect U.S. citizens from
imminent danger in a situation of
anarchy did not violate standards of
customary international law. The
United States chose, however, not to
rest its case on the principle of selfdl'fenSt~. Indl'l'd, hoth thl' Unilt'd Stalt's
and later the Organi~ation of Anwriean
States carefully avoided the ·use of the
term "self-defense," relying instead on
maintaining that its actions were sanctionl'd by tIlt' r('eogni~(~(1 prin('iplt~ of
humanitarian intervention. 11 The rt'ason why is clear. Any careful reading of
article!) I of the United Nations Charter
indicates that both individual states alHI
regiomll organizations must report to
and take orders from the United Nations for action taken under the guise of
the "inherent right" of self-defense.

Self-Defense. The best statement of
the conditions for the exercise of this
right of self-defense is found in the
principles laid down by Secretary of
State Daniel Wehster in the CarolilJ('
inddent of 1ll:~7. There must hI', he
said, "a necessitv of self-dcfens(', instant, overwhelming, leaving- no choice

Humanitarian Intervention. Tradi·
tional international law recognized the
principle of humanitarian intervention
when a state abused its right of sover(·ignty by pcrmilling within its It'rrilory
tlw treatmcnt of its own nationals or
foreigners in a manner violalivc of all
univcrsal standards of humanity. 12

Such authorities on Latin Amcrica
and the Organization of American
States as the husband and wife team of
A.J. Thomas and Ann Van Wynen
Thomas note that:
In view of the prohibition of the
use or threat of force against lhe
territorial integrity of a state set
forth in the United Nations Charter, the strong language prohibiting intervention in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the prohibition
against military occupation of a
state or the use of other measures
of force against a state, also in the
Charter of the Organization of
Ameriean Stales, it can be said
that armed intervention by a stale
on behalf of its nationals who
have suffered injury and a denial
of justide at the hands of another
government in order to enforce
reparation, to punish and prevent
future repetition, i.e., to impose
sanctions in the form of reprisals,
has been made illegal. 6
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Some maintain that the strict principles
of modern multilateral treaty law may
have completely abolished this right,
particularly the absolute ban on intervention of the Charter of the Organization of American States,13 while others
have continued to assert the legality of
humanitarian intervention. Of these
latter, the most eminent is Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, who finds intervention to
be legally permissible "when a State
renders itself guilty of cruelties against
and persecution of its nationals in such
a way as to deny their fundamental
human right and to shock the conscience of mankind,,,1 4 the rationale
being that a decent respect for human
rights and human dignity transcends the
doctrine of absolute soverrignty insulating a state from interference by the
international community. 15 An even
more meaningful justification is that of
necessity, for there is no remedy except
that of prevention.
Some Conclusions on Intervention.
[t is not inevitable that men
should ask whether it is morally
right to int!'rvene in the internal
affairs of other nations. To some,
it has obviously become a me~e
question of posture-how to kerp
a straight face while intervening,
how to smile piously when discovered, and how to win converts
during the montl upsurge that
should accompany the exposure
of others in the great game of
intervention. 16
Certainly it is difficult to equate international law and the concepts of domestic law with which we are all familiar. (n
a domestic court the law seems clear,
and it is usually quite enough to prrsuade the presiding ju<lge of what the
law is. The question, ought the court to
follow till' law, ~1'ldolll ari:::l's. If ~ound
policy dietatl's a changl' in existing law,
constitutional provisions arc provided to

seek such a change. International law,
on the other hand, has no international
legislature to make the rules of the game
for all to accept and follow. It has no
system of courts and no police force.
Moreover, the rules of international law
are far from being precise. There is
often a gap between what looks legal
and what looks reasonable. This gap is
most often closed by asserting that what
looks reasonable must be legal.
A far better view would be to make
an objective determination of what the
rule of international law is and then
seek to follow it. As Fisher points out:
Rules of law must be related not
only to the policies they are
designed to serve, but also to the
means by which compliance with
the rules is to be sought. For the
foreseeable future the basic means
by which compliance with international law may be obtained is
through the enlightened selfinterest of the various governments. If this is so, we must he
prepared to argue that respect for
international rules doet' in faet
serve the interest of eaeh government. The most fruitful perspective from which to discuss a question of international law may,
tlll!n:fon:, Ill: the one which sl!du!
to persuade a government offieial
of what a government ought to
do. I7

I nstead of taking the position that there
is no rule of international law to deal
with certain situations that are bound to
arise when dealing with the prohibition
of resort to force and nonintervention
principles contained in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of till:
Organization of American Stall's, and
tlll'refore the propl:r course is to pro('('1'(\ with whatl'VI'r pradieal aelions will
lIIost .uh'ance till! gl'III'rill interl'sts of
the United States, would it not be
heLLer to ask if our Nation's interests
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would be hetter scrved by making an
honest and determined effort to dcvelop
international law and live hy if?
Applying this concept, it iH COIlsidered very douhtful that interventions
solely for the protection of property of
nationals on foreign soil have any basis
in the modern law. Although the Suez
crisis of 1956 is generally regarded as
sounding the death knell of this concept, we can look to our own Government in our own hemisphere for another example. In May 1959 the
Agrarian Reform Law in Cuba provided
for expropriation of properties owned
by U.S. citizens. The basis of evaluation
was universally conceded to he unfairly
low, and compensation was in the form
of low interest Cuban honds redeemable
in 20 years. Under this law, property
was confiscated without court orders
and in some cases without written authorization. No inventories were taken
and no receipLs given. The U.S. Government did not question the expropriation
law but stated that it expected compensation in accordance with accepted rules
of international law. Within 1 year,
3900,000,000 worth of U.S. citizens'
investments were appropriated. Cuba
then took the position that any duty to
compensate would impose undue hardships on the Cuhan Government. 18 By
doing nothing, tlw U.S. (;oVt'rIllllcnt is
!'Cen as abrogating any right she lIlay
have maintained existed for interventions of this type, for international law,
as domestic law, is made through the
actions of governments and the precedents they create.
I ntervcntions for purely humanitarian reasons arc also suspcct. In the
Dominican Republic, prior to the overthrow of Trujillo, years of flagrant and
widespread violations of the human
rights of Dominican citizens were ignored. Following recognition of the
r.astro I!0vrrnlllrnt in Cuba. a wave of
political ('X('('utions siekenl'd tIll' llnill"d
!'tat(·s. but our (;ovrrnment, in line with
the general rule of refraining frolll

pressing forrign goverlllnents to trcat
their own citizens humanely, remained
silent. When the concept of humanitarian intervention was rmmrn:cted ill
A pril of ] 965 as justification for our
initial intcrvcntion in the Dominican
Republic, it was done to avoid reliance
on the available legal basis of selfdefense which would have occasioned
involvement with the United Nations.
This is not to condemn the right of
humanitarian intervention within the
collective framework of the United Nations or the Organization of American
States. The latter organization is particularly unique in the stress it lays on
the use of international law in matters
dealing with the international concern
for fundamental human rights,19 although the already discuss(!d scnsitivity
of Latin American States with respect
to intervention has enhanced the difficulty of devising effective international
measures for the protection of human
righLs. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights created in 1951 is
authorized to consider individual complaints of violations of certain basic
rights, among them the right to life and
libcrty, hut can only act in cxamining
and reporting on conditions in the
various states. Thus far, this Commission has proved unable to "hrcak the
ernst of tIl!! (:ntn!ndl!!d Ihinltillg 011
intervcntion.,,20
In any treatment of the subjcct of
intervcntion, mention must be made of
the views of those who maintain .that it
is policy and not law that determines
the actions of states in their dealings
with onc another. Foremost among
these is former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson who, in commenting on the
legal position of thl' United States in the
Cuban missile crisis, stated that "principles, certainly legal principles, do not
decide concrete cases," and that international law "simply dol'S not dral with
.
\1qU('51IOn5
II (. II I'
IlIlIal(' power. ,,2 t 1
Ihough this position is 11115atisfal'lory as
an appraisal of international law, it is,
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unfortunately, a realistic assessment of
the manner in which states approach the
conduct of international affairs.
Self-defense, within the narrow eonfines of the Weltster definition with
added emphasis on the principle of
proportionality in measures limited to
rrasonably repelling the danger, may, in
the final analysis, he the only legally
aeeeptahle grounds for intervention. To
!'Cnd 40!) troops into the Dominiean
Republic to eva<:uate U.S. citizens and
other foreign nationals meets this tesl.
To build up to 22,2B9 troops22 docs
not. To declare, as did President.l ohnson in his speech of 2 I\lay 1965, in
support of the massive involvement,
that the United States would not tolerate another Communist fovernment in
the Western Hemisphere 3 is to imply
that thl! United SLates reserves the right
to determine ,"Iu:ther or not there is
sufficient Communist involvement in an
internal revolution in the Western
Hemisphere to be regarded as dangerous
by the UniLed States, and, if so, the
right to intrrvene to prevent a Communist Lakeover. This, in turn, implies
possible intervrntion in any of the Latin
American SLates.24 Bearing in mind
that "Lhe shape of things to come is in
no small way determined hy the actions
o f grea L powers, ,,25 was LIlI're ~lI1y
rl'ason for us Lo he shock"d by Lhe
language of thl! "Brezhnev Doctrine"
when Rm;sia intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 19f1B'!
"In a world huilt upon naLional
sovereign Lies and .iurisdieLions and the
('quality of independent states, any sLate
that intervenes in the internal affairs of
anoLher undermines the instiLutioml1
and Irl!al foundations on whieh iLs own
exi~LI'ncI~ res LS.,,2 6 {InLiI Lhere is an
('ff('dive inLI'rnaLional orl!anizaLion Lo
1:01'1: with IIII' nllarll"'~ of power polili"l<,
LIlt' only hopi' for p('aI~(' and an onlt'r1y
~()('il'l y iii'S in IIII' major I'll WI' rs ' r('alizaIion IhaL n'slrainl :\1111 dl,dieal!'d :111Iwr('nl'l' Lo ('slahlislwt! and iIl"'('plt-d
principles of inLernaLional law an'

paramount in the inLerest of survival.

V-ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
That the Unit('d SLates used force Lo
proLect iLs nationals and their property
in the Latin American SLates in the 19th
and early 20th centuries is a maller of
doellmented facl. I t is also clear that
whaLever the posture of the United
SLaLes prior Lo World War II, iLs legal
obligalions havl: sinee ehanged considerably, particularly in view of its participation in the United Nations and Lhe
Organization of A merican States. While
a commanding officer may have acted
with impunity in the early 20th eentury
with regard to protecting U.S. citizens
on foreign soil, such is not the case
today. The fact remains, however, that
although customary international law
has changed and treaty obligations
imposl! restrain t, the prohlem of protecting nationals can hardly be termed
ohsolete. That the United States must
protect its citizens when a local government is unahle or unwilling to protect
them is as true today as it was in 1928
whclI Secretary II ughes addre5sed this
prohlem to the Sixth Conference of
Inter-A merit'an States.
Recognizing that prevention is the
only real remedy and that a state still
has a duty, if not a right, to protect its
citizens, how then is this protection to
he afforded? 1£ action is taken unilaterally, a plea of safety of nationals or
even humanitarian intervention may,
unfortunately, he a pretext for intervention having nationalistic or other ulterior aims. While most of the examples
of use of force cited by Offutt were
confined to the purpose avowed-the
protection of nationals-many possessed
unavoidable political significance. Such
significance would he inescapable today.
Certainly there is no country in Latin
America in which we do not have strong
political and economic interest.
Inter-American collective intervention through the auspices of the
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Org~nization

of American States would
solve many of the problems inherent in
unilateral action. 1 A permanen t rn ter·
American Peace Force would provide a
partial an~wer to the prac:tical problem
of devising a system capable of swift
action in future emergencies similar to
the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965.
The United States favors the creation of
such a force, and at the Second InterAmerican Conference at Rio de Janeiro
in November 1965 tried to interest the
Latin American nations in just thal. 2
~Iost Latin A merican States opposed
the idea. Their view was forcefully
stated in, Chilean Foreign l\linister
Gabriel Valdes' specch, when he said:
"The inter-American force would give
our regional system a negative and
dangerous ideological connotation, it
would destroy the fundamental principle of non-intervention and would
threaten to divide us into irreconcilable
blocs.,,3 Profes~or Plank suggests that
Latin AmeriealH; would eon~id('r that
any sUl'h force would he colledive in
name only; that the dominant position
of the United States would mean that
any intl:rvention would have to he
aeccptahle to and dominatcd hy it. 4 At
any ratc, the (I.S. intervention in the
Dominiean Repuhlic will leave lasting
scars, and it is doubtful that such a
forcc will ever he created.
Thus politically undesirable as it may
be, unilateral intervention would appear
to be the only answer. As discussed
supra, to be lawful such intervention
would have to be cncompasscd within
the concept of self-dcfense. I t would
have to meet the test of necessity, and,
above all, it would have to lIl~et the
standard of proportionality. As pointed
out by Professor Alford, "military
action taken to acquire territory, super-

sede a government, obtain special concessions or to secure various political
advantages, seems easily distinguishable
from limited action to protect ... citizenS which is terminated when the
persons are withdrawn or are otherwise
secured. "S
In today's politically oriented world,
any decision to intervene under the
principle of self-defense for the protection of the liVl's of U.S. ('itiz('ns ~houlcl,
ideally, be made at Llw high('st (;overnment level, leaving to tin: naval COIIImander only the task of implementing
this decision. Howevcr, since, in the
final analysis, pn:vcn tion is thl' ollly
remedy and timeliness is csscntial to
prevention, it is not difficult to envision
a situation where, despite modern communication techniques, the commanding officer must be prepared to
determine the best Course of action
under the circumstances and then implement his own decision.
Authority for such a deeh;ioll exists,
as it has since 189:~, in artieies 061:~ ancl
061,t of U.S. Navy Regulations. It remains only to update article 0614 to
conform to Illodrrn standards of custOlllary inL<'rnati()lwl law. I t is sll~~m;t(,cl
that this ('an III' m'('()Il1l'lislH'd hy the
simple expediency of deleting any reference to "property" and substituting the
words "sel f-dl'frma!" for the outmoded
language "sel f-preservation" wherever
the latter appears. Additionally, bearing
in mind the serious intrrJ)ational cOllsequenees that an application of force
could entail, it is suggested that specific
operation ordl'rs III' written with a view
toward giving commanding officcrs
definitive gliidalll'(~ in the enfor('rlllenL
of this right, rlllpha~izillg thc concept of
evacuation over all other means of
protcction.
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